While the decision is methodically structured, and commendably confronts the hybrid nature of AT1 instruments at the intersection of private and public law, its reasoning ultimately reveals substantial analytical weaknesses. First, the Federal Administrative Court attributes excessive weight to specific indicia (particularly single communications) when assessing both the parties’ intent and the authorities’ reactions during the critical days of March 2023, including the order to write down AT1s. Second and more fundamentally, the Federal Administrative Court underestimates the significance of the regulatory context in its interpretation of the contract and overestimates the sufficiency of the ordinary legal tools available to the authorities. With respect to contractual interpretation, AT1 instruments were introduced as part of the post-2008 crisis architecture with the specific aim of reducing the public cost of resolving systemically important banks, a function reflected in their risk profile and yield expectations ; these aspects would have justified abandoning a subjective approach in favor of an objective interpretation in the case at hand. From a public law perspective, the Court overestimates the completeness of the existing TBTF regime. In particular, the Federal Administrative Court overlooks the fact that the Public Liquidity Backstop mechanism is not provided by the current TBTF regulatory framework. Accordingly, both the interpretation of the relevant contractual clause and the assessment of the authorities’ response called for a functional approach reflecting the role of AT1 instruments and the scale of the systemic risk involved.

Dans l’arrêt B-2334/2023 du 1er octobre 2025, le Tribunal administratif fédéral a rendu un jugement partiel, lequel annule la décision de l’Autorité fédérale de surveillance des marchés financiers du 19 mars 2023 ordonnant l’amortissement des instruments de fonds propres de base supplémentaires (« Additional Tier 1 », « AT1 »). Ce commentaire se limite à résumer le jugement, sans émettre de remarques personnelles ou de critiques à son égard.

Lors de l’exécution d’ordres bancaires frauduleux, le tribunal doit appliquer une méthode en trois étapes afin de déterminer qui, de la banque ou du client, doit en supporter les conséquences. Contrairement à une jurisprudence discutable, la faute du client ne doit être examinée qu’à la troisième étape, laquelle permet d’atteindre un résultat plus équilibré et plus équitable (art. 4 CC). En outre, dans la très grande majorité des situations, l’absence de contestation à temps d’un ordre frauduleux n’interrompt pas la causalité entre la faute de la banque et le dommage découlant de l’ordre frauduleux. D’autres éventuelles fautes du client, par exemple être victime d’une escroquerie au président ou d’un piratage de sa boîte électronique, ne sauraient non plus en principe interrompre la causalité. Ces dernières hypothèses pourraient néanmoins entraîner une responsabilité du client (3e étape).

This article deals with the issue of conflicts of interest in the selection of collective investment schemes in Switzerland. Asset management and investment advice have changed considerably over the past four decades. While the first guidelines after the Credit Suisse scandal in 1977 outlined simple forms of investment such as fiduciary and fixed-interest investments, the focus today is on access to alternative investments such as hedge funds and private equity. Economic relationships result in conflicts of interest. This article examines the legal framework and focuses on analysing the significance of conflicts of interest in the financial sector, particularly in connection with the duty of loyalty towards clients. It explains how the Financial Services Act (FinSA) contributes to the identification and management of such conflicts of interest.